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Abstract
Using a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type general equilibrium framework with segmented factor
markets, we show that uniform technological progress in either the unorganized or the fixed-
wage organized sector can improve the real income of a small, open developing economy.
However, uniform productivity improvement in the unorganized sector turns out to be relatively
more egalitarian since it helps the marginalized informal workers in terms of wage-earnings and
employment whereas productivity take-off in the organized sector hurts them.
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21 Introduction
The purpose of our theoretical exercise is to explore the implications of different types of
technological progress on real income of a small open developing economy with distortions in
factor markets. It is well-known that in a developing economy ‘informal sector’ hosts substantial
part of the workforce in unregistered activities, primarily characterised by ease of entry and
unregulated markets. As suggested in many references (Agenor 1996; Schneider and Enste 2000
and the references therein) more than 70% of the workforce are engaged in the informal sectors
of a less developed country (LDC), such as 80% in Zambia, 83% in Myanmar and more than
90% in most of the South Asian countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal (except
Sri Lanka). Here we define ‘informal’ sector as one where minimum wage laws are not
maintained, in order to focus on the economic conditions of the majority of the workforce in a
typical developing economy. As showed in different papers (Chaudhuri 2001; Koizumi and
Kopecky 1977, 1980; Findlay 1978) liberalising a developing economy may result technological
progress as a peer-effect (such as an inflow of foreign capital usually leads to transfer of
technology from the foreign producers to the destination sector of the recipient country). But
such a technological change should have some impact on informal activities, wages and
employment. The way production is organized between the formal and informal segments should
also be affected. Although empirical evidence on the interaction between the formal and informal
sectors is quite limited and scattered there are a growing theoretical works dealing with the
informal sector of a relatively open, deregulated LDC. However as will be argued below, there
are caveats which we shall try to address in this paper.
There has been a pertinent debate on the desirability of various types of technological progress
among labor economists and trade-theorists (Jones 1996, 2003, 2006; Krugman 2000; Ethier
2005). Trade-theorists, emphasising the importance of relative factor intensities in different
sectors (Jones 1965; Oladi and Beladi 2007 and Beladi et al. 2008), argue that a labor-
augmenting type technological change in the labor-intensive sector will push the wages up. This
result is in contradiction to the usual predictions of labor economists. Findlay and Jones (2000)
argued that trade and labor theory outcomes will be merged for a major modification of
production structure consequent upon such a technological progress. The most recent attempt has
been made by Beladi et al. (2012) in terms of a simple two-sector general equilibrium model
3with segmented labor markets to show that technological progress leads to opposite wage
movement independent of relative factor-intensity ranking between organized (formal) and non-
organized (informal) labor sectors.
However a typical developing country also suffers from capital market segmentation among the
organized formal and non-organized informal sectors. The dominant feature of dualism in the
capital market is the fragmented interest rate structure, featuring fewer allocation of loanable
capital to the informal sector at a higher relative interest rate. The informal producers do not
have access to credit from formal institutions and therefore, have to depend on the informal
credit market, where rate of interest is exorbitantly high. We are going to incorporate this issue in
our paper. Similar like Beladi et al. (2012), we consider a two-sector full-employment general
equilibrium framework there is also an ‘organized’ (formal) sector where wage is pegged at a
higher level by prior negotiations with labor unions through collective bargaining. Those unable
to get a job in this high-wage sector would be absorbed in the ‘unorganized’ informal sector,
which is the largest employer of relatively unskilled workers. This description, albeit simplistic,
fits well for a typical developing economy with sizable informal sector (such as India, Pakistan
and so on). Therefore our model is different from the standard Harris-Todaro (1970) type
structure, featuring rural-urban migration with the existence of urban unemployment. But unlike
Beladi et al. (2012) in our model, the formal sector faces a perfect capital market whereas the
unorganized sector has the imperfect capital market but competitive labor market. It is also
evident in our model that both sectors use the same two inputs viz., capital and labor in the
production process and hence the general equilibrium framework is of the standard Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) type.
We shall use this framework to explore implications of uniform technological progress (all the
factors of production become equally more productive in the particular sector experiencing
technological progress) in organized and unorganized sectors on the real income of a small, open
economy1. To the best of our knowledge no such effort has been made yet in the general
equilibrium setting with segmented factor markets. This exercise should be regarded as a novel
1 We are not showing implications for labor or capital saving technological progress for each sector separately since
either of them would fetch the same results we obtain with uniform technological progress.
4extension of Beladi et al. (2012) and it would be informative to judge the welfare implications of
such technological improvement just by answering two major questions:
(a) What are the implications of such policies on the real income of a small, open economy?
(b) How the competitive wages and employment of the relatively marginalized workers are
affected in the unorganized sector?
The next sections will describe the model and the comparative static exercises while the last
section briefly describes the concluding remarks and some possible extensions of our work.
2 The model
In this general equilibrium model, production functions follow constant returns to scale (CRS)
technology. The following notations are used:
ܹ = competitive informal wage rate for labor;
ܹ ∗= Institutionally given wage rate in organized/formal sector of the economy;
ܴ =rental return in the informal credit market;
ݎ=rental return in the formal credit market;
௝ܽ௜= amount of the ݆
th factor used to produce 1 unit of the ݅th good (݆= ܮ,ܭ;݅= 1,2);
ܭഥ = total stock of capital in the economy;
ܭଵ = available credit in informal sector;
௜ܲ= internationally given prices of good (݅݅= 1,2);
ߠ௝௜= cost-share of factor ݆in the production of good ;݅
ߣ௝௜= share of sector i݅n the total employment of factor ;݆
5∧ = proportional change.
Our simple 2×2 general equilibrium framework is described by the following set of equations:
ܹ ௅ܽଵ + ܴ ௄ܽଵ = ଵܲ (1)
ܹ ∗ ௅ܽଶ + ܽݎ ௄ଶ = ଶܲ (2)
We do not model the issues of wage-fixation explicitly2. We just assume, like Beladi et al.
(2012), the wage in sector 2 is institutionally given and fixed (or rigid) at a higher rate ܹ ∗ > ܹ .
We assume the following functional relationship between ܴandݎ
ܴ = ߩݎ;ߩ> 1 (3)
Here ߩ denotes the degree of imperfection of the informal credit market. ߩ> 1 implies that
ܴ > ݎ. This is because the informal moneylenders generally borrow funds from the formal sector
at the market rate of return ݎ, re-lend it to the informal borrowers and by this way maximises net
interest income3. Therefore it is realistic to assume that informal interest rate is positively related
to and steeply higher than the formal interest rate. The lower the number of alternative sources of
credit to the borrowers in the informal sector, the higher is the degree of imperfection in the
informal credit market and thereby the power of the informal sector lenders to mark up interest
rate in the informal credit market over the one in formal capital market (i.e., greater value of ߩ)4.
However we treat ߩ here as a policy-parameter.
Substituting ܴ from Equation (3) into Equation (1) we obtain:
ܹ ௅ܽଵ + ߩܽݎ ௄ଵ = ଵܲ (1.1)
2 One can see Mukherjee (2012, 2014) for similar treatment.
3 So ݎcould also be interpreted as the opportunity cost of lending credit to the moneylender.
4 Our story is consistent with the ideas developed in existing literature where informal credit markets have been
modelled either as monopolies (see for example Bhaduri, 1977; Rudra, 1982; and Basu, 1984, 1998; Chaudhuri and
Gupta, 2014) or as fragmented oligopolies (Basu and Bell, 1991; Mishra, 1994). Our assumption is also consistent
with lender’s risk hypothesis (Bottomley, 1975). For details, see Chaudhuri (2003). We are not going to formally
analyze the behavior of the informal moneylenders here given the focus of this paper. However, one can see
Chaudhuri and Gupta (2014) for a formal analysis of the behaviour of a monopolistic moneylender as the only
source of credit in the informal credit market.
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organized sectors respectively. We also assume that amount of credit allocated to the informal
sector is a positive function of the return differential between the two capital markets. Therefore
as long as ߩ> 1, informal capital market exists and thus the dichotomy between the two credit
markets exists.
ܭଵ = ܭଵ(ܴ − ݎ) = ܭଵ{ݎ(ߩ− 1)}. So when (ܴ − ݎ) ≥ 0,ܭଵᇱ(. ) ≥ 0. (4)
So full utilisation of informal credit implies
௄ܽଵܺଵ = ܭଵ(ܴ − ݎ) = ܭଵ{ݎ(ߩ− 1)}; ܭଵ(. ) ≥ 0 as long as (ܴ − ݎ) ≥ 0 (5)
Note that Equation (5) is not an independent equation since it only states that part of the
available credit is allocated to the informal credit market5.
Similarly for formal credit:
௄ܽଶܺଶ = ܭഥ− ܭଵ(. ) (6)
Full-employment of labor implies (normalising economy’s total labor-endowment to utility):
௅ܽଵ ଵܺ + ௅ܽଶܺଶ = 1 (7)
National income at world prices would give us:
ܻ = ܹ + (ܹ ∗ − ܹ ) ௅ܽଶܺଶ + ݎܭഥ+ (ܴ − ݎ)ܭଵ(. ) (8)
We have 5 independent equations, namely Equations (1.1), (2), (4), (6) and (7); to solve for 5
endogenous variables, namely: ܹ ,ݎ,ܭଵ, ଵܺ and ܺଶ. The determination of endogenous variables
is as follows. From Equation (2) we can determine ݎ given the rigid formal wage (ܹ ∗). Given
the policy parameter ߩ, substituting ݎ in Equation (1.1) we can find the competitive informal
5 For similar treatment see Chaudhuri (2003). It is worth to mention that Chaudhuri (2003) has considered the
dualism in capital/credit market in the same fashion to consider the welfare implications of different liberalization
policies. However, that paper considered a Harris-Todaro type economy while we have considered a full-
employment model with segmentation in labor market. The justification for considering full-employment structure
with segmented labor market has been discussed in the introduction.
7wage ܹ . So the factor coefficients are also known as the factor prices are already determined in
terms of exogenous commodity prices and other parameters. Once ݎ is known, given ߩ, we can
use Equation (4) to determine ܭଵ. Substituting ܭଵ in Equation (6), we can solve for ܺଶ. Then
substituting ܺଶ in Equation (7), we get ܺଵ.
3 Comparative static exercises
3.1 Uniform technological progress in sector 2
Suppose the productivity parameters are such that sector 2 undergoes uniform technological
progress by ߙ > 0, ceteris paribus. This essentially means the same percentage reduction (i.e.,
here by α%) in labor and capital coefficients in sector 2. The implications on informal sector
wage can be expressed as
෡ܹ = −(ߙߠ௄ଵ ߠ௅ଵߠ௄ଶ)⁄ < 0 (9)
While returns to capital in both sectors will rise.
ݎƸ= ߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ > 0 (10)
Totally differentiating Equations (6) and (7) and using Cramer’s rule, one obtains
෠ܺ
ଵ = −{ߙ (ߠ௄ଶߣ௅ଵ)⁄ }[ܣ+ ߣ௅ଶ{ ௄ܵ௅ଶ − (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1)}] (11)
Where ௝ܵ௞௜ = ൫߲ ௝ܽ௜ ߲ݓ௞⁄ ൯൫ݓ௞ ௝ܽ௜⁄ ൯is the elasticity of substitution between factors ݆and݇ in the
t݅h sector; ,݆݇= ܮ,ܭand݅= 1,2. ௝ܵ௞௜ > 0 for݆≠ ݇andܵ௞௞௜ < 0 Also,
ܣ = [ߣ௅ଵ ௅ܵ௄ଵ (1 ߠ௅ଵ⁄ ) + ߣ௅ଶ ௅ܵ௄ଶ ] > 0 (11.1)
෠ܺ
ଶ = (ߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[ ௄ܵ௅ଶ − (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1)] (12)
8Therefore from Equations (11) and (12) it is clear that if ௄ܵ௅ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1) holds;
෠ܺ
ଶ > 0, ෠ܺଵ < 0.
If the organized sector experiences uniform technological progress, ݎwill go up since wages are
fixed in the organized sector and therefore from the zero-profit condition of the informal sector,
it is clear that competitive informal wages will fall. Note that alike Beladi et al. (2012) here also
we do not need any assumption about relative factor-intensities between the sectors to yield the
implications on factor returns. So producers in both the sectors will switch to more labor-
intensive techniques of production and hence capital-output rations, ௄ܽ௜s will fall in both the
sectors. Now since ݎ rises, (ܴ − ݎ) = ݎ(ߩ− 1) goes up as well. This will lower the supply of
capital to the formal credit market. Therefore two opposite effects are operating on ܺଶ: given the
supply of credit to the organized formal sector (ܭഥ− ܭଵ(. )), the fall in ௄ܽଶ will increase ܺଶ;
while for given ௄ܽଶ, lower supply of capital to the formal credit market will affect adversely the
formal sector. However under the sufficient condition ௄ܵ௅ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1)6, the
formal sector will expand and will attract more workers from the informal sector. As a result
informal sector producers will have to depend on the relatively more costly capital for the
production and hence the effective price of commodity 1 net of capital-cost will fall in the
informal sector. Therefore informal sector will contract both in terms of output and employment
since relatively productive workers will now join the formal sector. This leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 1a: If only the organized sector undergoes uniform technological progress by ߙ >0, ceteris paribus, returns to capital rise in both the sectors while competitive wage falls
unambiguously. However if ௄ܵ௅ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1) holds; formal sector will expand
while informal sector will contract both in terms of output and employment.
Subsequently it follows from the expression of national income at world prices
6 This condition states that elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in sector 2 should be sufficiently
high, so that when capital (credit) availability in formal sector falls, sector 2 can still expand by switching towards
more labor-intensive techniques of production.
9ܻ෠ܻ= (ߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[(ܹ ∗ − ܹ )ߣ௅ଶ{ ௅ܵ௄ଶ + ௄ܵ௅ଶ − (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1)}] + (ݎߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[(ܭഥ− ܭଵ) +(ߩ− 1){ܭଵ(. ) + ݎ(ߩ− 1)ܭଵᇱ(. )}]
(13)
Assumption: Without any loss of generality we assume that sector 2 is relatively capital-
intensive vis-à-vis sector 1 in physical and value terms.
Above assumption just restates that the formal sector is the most capital-intensive sector of the
economy. And sector 1 uses more labor-intensive techniques in the production process than the
other sector in value terms, i.e., (ܹ ௅ܽଵ ௄ܽଵ⁄ ) > (ܹ ∗ ௅ܽଶ ௄ܽଶ⁄ ); which trivially implies sector 1
is relatively more labor-intensive in physical terms.
Therefore a productivity improvement in the formal sector will produce two different impacts on
the aggregate wage-income: (a) direct negative effect on ܹ given ܺ௜s; (b) if
௄ܵ௅
ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1), the higher wage-paying formal sector expands at the expense of
the lower wage-paying informal sector (positive ‘output effect’) leading to labor reallocation
between the sectors of the economy, which will affect the aggregate wage income of the workers
positively. Also note that aggregate rental income of the economy will increase unequivocally.
So there will be two different effects on the economy’s per capita income:
(a) Changes in aggregate factor-income given the labor-reallocation effect, captured by(ݎߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[(ܭഥ− ܭଵ) + (ߩ− 1){ܭଵ(. ) + ݎ(ߩ− 1)ܭଵᇱ(. )}]. Here (ܭഥ− ܭଵ) denotes the net
supply of domestic credit to the formal sector, in the absence of any foreign capital in the
economy’s aggregate capital endowment. And therefore given that the formal sector is
the most capital-intensive sector in this set-up, (ܭഥ− ܭଵ) is unambiguously positive in
our model. Hence (ݎߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[(ܭഥ− ܭଵ) + (ߩ− 1){ܭଵ(. ) + ݎ(ߩ− 1)ܭଵᇱ(. )}] is always
positive in our set-up when ݎ rises. However if we would take into account the presence
of foreign capital in this set-up, then the rental income of the economy from domestic
capital employed would become {ݎܭ஽ + (ܴ − ݎ)ܭଵ(. )} in the expression for national
income in world prices (Equation (8)), with ܭ஽being the stock of domestic capital. In that
case we would require (ܭ஽ − ܭଵ) to be non-negative in order for (ݎߙ ߠ௄ଶ⁄ )[(ܭഥ− ܭଵ) +(ߩ− 1){ܭଵ(. ) + ݎ(ߩ− 1)ܭଵᇱ(. )}] > 0. And that would almost always be true if the stock
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of foreign capital in the aggregate capital endowment of the economy is not exorbitantly
high.
And,
(b) Changes in aggregate wage-income following the output effect in the organized sector,
which is positive if ௄ܵ௅ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1) is satisfied.
Thus there is a clear possibility for the economy-wide per capita income to rise following a
uniform technological progress in the formal sector under the sufficient condition mentioned in
(b). This enables us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 1b: Real income of the economy will rise following a policy of uniform
technological progress in the formal sector if ௄ܵ௅ଶ > (ܭଵᇱ(. ) ܭഥߣ௄ଶ⁄ )ݎ(ߩ− 1) is satisfied.
This policy of uniform technological improvement in the formal sector, although could be
welfare ameliorating, the benefit of expansion of economy-wide per capita income would not
‘trickle down’ to the economically marginalized people in the informal sector. This is because
the workers attached to the informal sector would become worse off in terms of wage-earnings
and employment.
3.2 Uniform technological progress in sector 1
Let us assume only sector 1 would undergo uniform productivity improvement by ߙ > 0, ceteris
paribus. It is easy to verify from Equations (1) and (2) that
ݎƸ= 0 (14)
And
෡ܹ = (ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ ) > 0 (15)
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Since ݎ is not changing, no credit-reallocation takes place between different capital markets. So
substituting (5) into (6) we can write for full utilisation of capital between the two markets:
௄ܽଵ ଵܺ + ௄ܽଶܺଶ = ܭഥ (6.1)
Totally differentiating (5.1) and (7) and using the Cramer’s rule one can obtain7:
෠ܺ
ଵ = (ܤଵ |ߣ|⁄ )(ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ ) (16)
And
෠ܺ
ଶ = −(ܤଶ |ߣ|⁄ )(ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ ) (17)
Where |ߣ| = (ߣ௅ଵߣ௄ଶ− ߣ௄ଵߣ௅ଶ) > 0 under the assumption that the formal sector is relatively
capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal sector in physical and value terms.
ܤଵ = (ߣ௅ଵ ௅ܵ௄ଵ ߣ௄ଶ + ߣ௄ଵ ௄ܵ௅ଵ ߣ௅ଶ) > 0 (16.1)
ܤଶ = ߣ௅ଵߣ௄ଵ( ௅ܵ௄ଵ + ௄ܵ௅ଵ ) > 0 (17.1)
So from (16) and (17) it follows that ෠ܺଵ > 0 andܺ෠ଶ < 0 following a uniform technological
improvement in sector 1.
As ݎ is pegged by the exogenous commodity price in sector 2 and the unionised wage, any
productivity improvement in the informal sector is going to increase the competitive wage and as
a result the producers in sector 1 will adopt more capital-intensive techniques than before. So
௄ܽଵ rises while ௅ܽଵ falls. Given ܺ௜s, this will generate relative shortage of capital and thereby a
‘Rybczynski-type’ effect8 due to which the relatively capital-intensive formal sector will contract
while the relatively labor-intensive unorganized sector would expand.
7 Note that ఫܽଶෞ = 0, for݆= ܮ,ܭsince ݎƸ= 0 and ܹ ∗෢ = 0.
8 This is slightly different from the usual ‘Rybczynski effect’. Whenever technologies of production are of variable-
coefficient type, any change in factor returns will lead to changes in unit factor-coefficients and subsequent changes
in output-compositions.
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It follows from the expression of national income at world prices
ܻ෠ܻ= (ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ ) ൥ܹ ߣ௅ଵᇣᇤᇥ
வ଴
+ (ܹ − ܹ ∗)ߣ௅ଶ(ܤଶ |ߣ|⁄ )ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ழ଴
൩ (18)
Or assuming that production function in each sector is of Cobb-Douglas type9, substituting ܤଶ
from (17.1) into Equation (18), one can easily obtain by simple manipulation:
ܻ෠ܻ= (ߙߣ௅ଵ |ߣ|ߠ௅ଵ⁄ )[(ܹ ௅ܽଵ ௄ܽଵ⁄ ) − (ܹ ∗ ௅ܽଶ ௄ܽଶ⁄ )] (18.1)
From Equation (18) it is clear that aggregate wage income is affected by:
(a) Direct positive effect on ܹ and thereby increase in wage-income of the informal
workers, captured by (ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ )ܹ ߣ௅ଵ > 0.
And,
(b) Negative ‘output effect’ due to the contraction of formal sector, captured by
൛– (ߙ ߠ௅ଵ⁄ )(ܹ ∗ − ܹ )ߣ௅ଶ(ܤଶ |ߣ|⁄ )ൟ< 0, for which some of the laborers will be
reallocated to the informal sector.
However as long as sector 1 is more labor-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 in value and physical
terms, we have
(ܹ ௅ܽଵ ௄ܽଵ⁄ ) > (ܹ ∗ ௅ܽଶ ௄ܽଶ⁄ ) and |ߣ| > 0.
Therefore from Equation (18.1) we see that the aggregate wage-income of the economy will go
up in this case and since aggregate rental income is not changing (as ݎdoes not change) impact
on the real income of the economy will also be positive. There the following proposition can be
established.
9 This is a simplifying assumption. It implies that elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in each sector is
unity.
13
Proposition 2: If the informal sector undergoes uniform technological progress, ceteris paribus,
informal wage will rise and if the informal sector is more labor-intensive than the formal sector
in physical and value terms, the former will expand in terms of both output and employment
while the latter will contract but real income of the economy will go up.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has made a novel attempt to analyze the welfare implications of sector-specific
uniform technological progress for a small, open developing economy in a two-sector full
employment general equilibrium structure with distortions in both labor and capital markets. We
have found that when the organized sector undergoes uniform productivity improvement, the per
capita income of the economy may increase but the workers attached to the informal sector could
be worse off in terms of wages and employment. However, if the unorganized sector goes
through a uniform technological improvement, laborers in the relatively labor-intensive informal
sector could benefit in terms of wages and employment and the per capita income of the
economy would go up as well. Therefore from the policy perspective, productivity improvement
in the unorganized informal sector will be more egalitarian in this set-up.
We suggest the following future directions of our research. One possible extension of our
framework could be to incorporate the informal sectors producing non-tradable items (final
commodities and/or intermediate inputs) in order to examine the possible implications of
technological progress in the traded sectors. Another interesting direction could be to investigate
the same research question using an oligopolistic Heckscher-Ohlin framework (like the
framework of Lahiri and Ono 2011) where one of the two sectors is oligopolistic.
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